

# Objection (“Einwendung”) to the expansion of the Lingen fuel element factory

## Close the Lingen nuclear factory – No business with Rosatom!



**I object against the proposed conversion and expansion of the Lingen fuel element factory with the purpose of producing hexagonal fuel elements for Russian-type reactors** (as announced on 20 December 2023, Ref42-40311/06/12/23/40-0003-006):

1. The planned production of fuel elements under licence from and with the cooperation and participation of the Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom **would give the Kremlin access to the nuclear infrastructure in Germany and Western Europe.** The Lingen fuel element factory possesses security sensitive information on numerous nuclear facilities in Europe. The planned cooperation is therefore associated with a high risk of espionage and sabotage, and the reliability of the applicant required under German nuclear law cannot be guaranteed when cooperating with Rosatom.

In a separate investment review procedure in early 2022, the German government came to the conclusion that cooperation with Rosatom in fuel element production in Lingen jeopardizes the security interests of Germany and its allies. The results of this review must be part of the current nuclear licensing procedure.

Rosatom’s involvement in Lingen would also increase Russia’s political influence on European energy policy and undermine any sanctions against the Russian nuclear sector already being discussed at an EU level. The public interest is opposed to the project in many ways. It endangers the security of Germany and its partners.

2. The planned expansion of the factory would **promote the continued operation of dangerous nuclear reactors throughout Europe**, such as the Czech nuclear power plant Temelín or the Bulgarian nuclear power plant Kozloduy. It would also support the Kremlin’s efforts to build more Rosatom nuclear power plants in Europe. Both would increase nuclear risks and energy dependency. Instead, the German federal and state governments must finally work towards an end to the Lingen nuclear plant.

3. The expansion would also **significantly increase local safety risks and burdens.** For example, the number of uranium transports would increase significantly. A much larger quantity of radioactive material would be processed and stored than is currently the case. The risk of accidents in the plant itself and when handling the dangerous uranium hexafluoride would also increase. Accidents such as a fire on 6 December 2018 demonstrate that the operator cannot rule out these risks.

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Please send completed lists **by 20 February 2024** to **.ausgestrahlt, Große Bergstraße 189, 22767 Hamburg, Germany.**

.ausgestrahlt will hand them over to the Lower Saxony Ministry of the Environment on time.

More information: [ausgestrahlt.de/Lingen](https://ausgestrahlt.de/Lingen)

Please support our campaign against the expansion of the Lingen fuel element factory and its cooperation with Rosatom by making a donation:  
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